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TS #165180, cy1

Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP62S01099R000100010010-2

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26 FEB 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT : Summary of Survey Report of FI Staff, DD/P

1. The IG Survey of the FI Staff was completed in December 1958 after a detailed inspection of its activities that extended over a period of four months. In the course of inspection, approximately 70 per cent of FI Staff personnel were interviewed as were the chiefs, senior officers and operating personnel of other components of the DD/P, and senior officials of DD/S and DD/I offices and the DD/C's staff. An interview was held with the Director, NSA, and with selected officers of that Agency.

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2. The FI Staff has an authorized ceiling of [redacted] positions and a current personnel strength of approximately [redacted]. It is

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organized into an Office of the Chief [redacted]

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[redacted], a [redacted]

Immediately prior to the commencement of this inspection, three components of the FI Staff were transferred to the recently formed Operational Services. They are

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[redacted]

inspection of the immediate office of the DD/P.

3. The mission of the FI Staff is stated as: "planning and staff supervision of the proper performance of all organized Federal espionage operations outside the United States and its

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possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required to meet the needs of all departments and agencies concerned." The statement is imprecise and poorly defines the role of the Staff in giving guidance, direction and support to the area divisions' efforts to collect intelligence information and to the DCI's responsibility for the coordination of organized Federal espionage operations. Much of the time spent on this survey was devoted to the proper identification of the responsibilities of the Staff and its appropriate position in the Clandestine Services.

25X1A 4. Two major units of the FI Staff, Operations Division and RQM, are principally engaged in the detailed review of individual projects. [REDACTED] such projects to be reviewed annually, plus a fairly steady flow of new projects referred to the Staff for consideration. The function consumes much time and manpower but the benefits derived are not commensurate with the effort expended. The new delegation of approving authority to Division Chiefs for projects costing not more than \$10,000 offers the Staff an opportunity to divest itself of much of this activity and redirect its efforts to more productive functions.

5. The Operations Division is responsible for establishing standards of performance in methodology, techniques and tradecraft of foreign intelligence operations. Its officers seek to learn the status of CS operations by reviewing individual projects, reading daily cable and dispatch traffic and maintaining contact with area division personnel. Because so much of their time is devoted to

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project review, Division officers are unable to effectively engage in broader program reviews and the development of much needed operational doctrine. The Division's efforts should be redirected into these more productive channels.

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6. [REDACTED] is

the focal point for the planning and staff supervision of espionage operations for the collection of scientific and technical information, except ELINT, which is assigned [REDACTED]. The Branch has been assigned very broad responsibilities including advice to area divisions in conducting operations, handling requirements, guidance to the divisions in the dissemination of reports, coordination of counterespionage material concerned with scientific matters, taking appropriate action on raw materials of scientific and technical intelligence value and controlling liaison with other components of CIA and other agencies of the Government. The Branch has some outstanding achievements to its credit. However, it also has some longstanding problems which the survey report attempts to resolve.

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7. [REDACTED] has developed a "stable" of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]


developed a degree of competition between them. Such actions lead to inadequate coordination of operations with no benefits accruing to the Agency.

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8. Three R&D projects are managed [REDACTED] in support of collection operations against Soviet and Satellite BW and CW targets.

These are designed to develop techniques for identifying antibiotics

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nated under these projects since 1953. The usefulness of these reports is impaired by unnecessarily severe security restrictions imposed by [REDACTED] in preparing source descriptions and information concerning laboratory procedures, techniques and controls used in the analyses. OSI and other consumers are reluctant to accept the conclusions contained in the reports without this vital information. These security restrictions can be eased without incurring unusual risks. It is also suggested in the survey report that consideration be given to the transfer of these projects to TSS.

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9. Another major problem in the scientific and technical collection program concerns the lack of a sufficient number of case officers and other operating personnel with scientific backgrounds or training. Only two of the regular members of [REDACTED] are qualified in a scientific field and only five area division case officers overseas can be identified as trained S&T officers. In addition OSI has a team of scientists

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[REDACTED], but these are serving only a limited purpose in the

[REDACTED] and support of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and are not engaged directly in clandestine operations. This situation can be readily improved by the rotation of selected officers from OSI to area divisions for overseas duty and to increased participation in the recently developed training course for scientific and technical case officers.

10. Requirements Division (RQM) is the FI Staff component responsible for handling information collection requirements, reviewing and obtaining evaluations of information reports, establishing and monitoring standards of reporting and conducting liaison with consumers on matters of collection and dissemination of information. It also provides the secretariat for the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC).

11. In pursuing its objectives RQM also devotes a substantial part of its time to the review of individual projects. For the purposes of RQM, this effort is no more productive than it is for Operations Division and should be substantially reduced. A broader program should be undertaken by RQM to review reporting and to obtain evaluations based on total production of field stations or selected geographic areas rather than on individual projects.

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12. Collection requirements remain the most serious problem of the Clandestine Services. RQM makes a strong effort to exercise some control over the demands made on it by consumers for information on all subjects and from all countries of the world. At the time of inspection, there were 1,300 active ad hoc requirements on file in RQM

in addition to the IPC requirements and target lists and the comprehensive collection guides prepared by consumer offices. Attempts to meet these demands result in a great volume of reporting but much of it is questionable in terms of the need for collection by clandestine means. The examination of the requirements problem goes well beyond the FI Staff and the Clandestine Service and is the subject of a separate report to the DCI.

13. Of more immediate concern to RQM are such problems as a closer followup of intelligence gaps identified by NIE post-mortems, the development of better Related Mission Directives (RMD's), and the better utilization of IPC lists of collection priorities as the basis for operational planning. Each of these is treated in the report with appropriate recommendations for improvement.

14. The time lag in the dissemination of cabled information reports also was studied. One of the factors contributing to the delay in dissemination is the practice of preparing a so-called [REDACTED] [REDACTED] report with the information taken from the cable. This process is time-consuming and duplicative since the normal cable distribution is generally the same [REDACTED] with the exception of external consumers. Direct dissemination of the cable and elimination [REDACTED] is feasible and is recommended in the survey report.

15. Several purely administrative services are performed by RQM which are believed to be inappropriate to a senior staff. These are useful services and should be continued but they should be performed elsewhere and, thus, free senior officers to concentrate on more important staff functions.

16. The Plans Group is concerned primarily with the coordinating of Agreed Activities and policy liaison with the military services and with coordinating the FI position on major DD/P planning papers and RMDs. It does not engage in planning in the accepted sense of the term and under the present organization of the Clandestine Services it cannot effectively do so. A long-range system for planning the world-wide allocation and utilization of Clandestine Services resources against approved objectives cannot be developed as long as each senior staff is in direct competition with the others for its share of area division resources.

17. The problem extends beyond the realm of the FI Staff and must be dealt with in terms of the over-all organization and functions of the DD/P. The recently organized FI Planning Board offers the means to bring about some improvement in planning but the basic problem must be resolved by the development of a more effective planning system in the DD/P.

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18. [REDACTED] is the FI Staff component charged with responsibility for initiating and supervising the collection of COMINT and

[REDACTED]  
within the Clandestine Services; and for performing other special functions related to COMINT. It has a current personnel strength

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[REDACTED] and is organized into five functional branches and five staffs. Suggestions have been made in the report toward a consolidation of units to improve management efficiency.

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[REDACTED]

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progress has been made in the development of joint ELINT operations.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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21. A major improvement in the collection of positive and opera-

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tional COMINT has been achieved through the development of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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The activities are conducted by the Office of Communications with the collaboration of [REDACTED]

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22. [REDACTED] as the COMINT center for the DD/P receives, stores and disseminates COMINT material throughout the Clandestine Services. This includes special intelligence publications of OCI, Army and State. A reading room is maintained for the benefit of all SI-cleared personnel. An Analysis Section reviews the daily flow

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of COMINT for items of interest to the area divisions--a service well handled and much appreciated by operating personnel.

23. A Biographic Section maintains extensive files of informa-

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25X1A These files are used in processing operational security clearances, and are commonly known as [REDACTED]. Additional CE support is provided by the Analysis Section in selecting and carding information of general CE interest at the request of area divisions. This effort is valuable in certain fields but a question arises in relating the value to the time and manpower expended. The CI Staff has thus far not participated actively in these efforts and has not given [REDACTED] 25X1A [REDACTED] the guidance it needs. In fact, the CI Staff feels conclusively that [REDACTED] CE activities are an infringement on its area of responsibility, and that such activities should be transferred to it forthwith. Such transfer of activities would require the establishment of a second SI Center, and would incur extensive duplication of effort. It is not supportable at the present time. The attitude of the CI Staff in placing undue emphasis on its own prerogatives hampers the close collaboration with [REDACTED] that could produce a better managed CE effort. 25X1A

25X1A 24. Among the special functions of [REDACTED] are certain activities of a very sensitive nature. One concerns the handling of a developmental project for equipment of COMINT interest. Another involves research in old COMINT material for security information of current value. [REDACTED] also has been engaged in terminating project

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██████████ and converting some of its remaining assets to the support of other projects. A small special purpose language center has been established and an IBM machine unit is being adapted to the needs of the CE and intelligence files.

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25. ██████████ responsibilities and actions in the ELINT

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field are deserving of added comment. ██████████ is charged with staff direction and supervision of all DD/P ELINT activities but, to date, it has not discharged this responsibility effectively. Its efforts have consisted primarily of protracted exchanges of proposals and counterproposals between the AD/SI, the Agency ELINT Staff Officer, Director of Communications and others concerned with ELINT matters. Partly for this reason and partly because of the general confusion that surrounds ELINT, initially inadequate requirements and the shortage of ELINT specialists ██████████ has had little success in generating ELINT operations in the Clandestine Services. In fact, the Agency as a whole has spent far too much time and effort on legalistic and theoretical arguments on the size, shape and direction of an ELINT program and too little time on getting the job done.

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
██████████ must step up its efforts, particularly in the initiation of an expanded Clandestine Services collection program, and in the coordination of activities and policy matters with other components.

26. In conclusion, the IG finds that the FI Staff should be credited with some excellent achievements which are counterbalanced by some major weaknesses. Its principal deficiencies are these:

(a) It devotes too large a share of its energies to nonproductive

policing of area division activities at the expense of much needed staff work, and (b) it suffers from poor direction in the managerial sense in that command authority and staff responsibility have been intermingled in the assignment of missions to the Staff. This is unsound, generally, in principle and frequently creates insurmountable problems for the Chief in his relations with the commanders of operating components. The Senior Staffs should be providing staff support to the DD/P and COPS by giving them assistance, advice, and guidance in the advancement of the Agency's clandestine mission. Under the present arrangement, the purely staff effort is diluted by mixing in a measure of command authority. As a result the staff support is inadequate and the command authority has become the primary source of friction and antagonism between Staff and area division. Recommendations aimed at improving these conditions are contained in the report.

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick  
Inspector General

Attachment  
(Survey of FI Staff)

**SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET**

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	<u>Summary</u> of Inspector General's Survey of the Foreign Intelligence Staff	REGISTRY
SOURCE Inspector General		CIA CONTROL NO. TS #165180
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